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CUMULATIVE REMEDIES UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: AN ANSWER TO
FUENTES v. SHEVIN
The right to take possession of collateral after default has long been
the most effective and inexpensive remedy available to secured parties.
This was true at common law and under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. However, in Fuentes v. Shevin,2 the Supreme Court re-
cently decided that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires an opportunity for a debtor to be heard before collateral can
be taken from him through replevin proceedings. Additionally, a series
of lower court decisions3 have held that the same constitutional require-
ments extend to other summary prejudgment remedies, including self-
help repossession under Article 9.4 Together, these decisions have evis-
cerated repossession as the principle weapon in a secured party's arsenal
of remedies. Before taking possession, the secured party now must se-
cure a judicial order in an adversary proceeding. Immediate compliance
with this requirement is problematic, since many states presently have
no procedural provisions for such adversary proceedings.
This Comment will suggest a method by which some of the vitality
of the repossession remedy can be restored to secured parties. The sug-
1. The secured party may gain possession with, or in some cases without, judicial
process. UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 9-503. Repossession is usually followed by sale
of the collateral and suit for deficiency.
2. 92 S. Cr. 1983 (1972). The Court held that Florida and Pennsylvama prejudgment
replevin provisions worked a deprivation of property without due process of law be-
cause they denied the debtor an opportunity to be heard before chattels were taken
from him. The Court cited Smadach v. Family Finance Corp, 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969),
for the proposition that "due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hear-
ing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the
underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property."
3. See, e.g., Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corp., 338 F Supp. 390 (ND. Ill. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
(ED. Pa. 1970); Kin v. Jones, 315 F Supp. 109 (ND Cal. 1970). Contra, e.g., Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms Inc. v.
Dick, 323 F Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317
F Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (DD.C. 1970).
4. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484,
9th Cir., -, 1972. Contra, Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Green v. First Nat'l Bank, CCH INsTALLMENT CaDrr GUmE S1,930 (WD. Va. Sept.
1972).
Code section 9-503 provides that a secured party may take possession without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace.
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gested method will employ a novel application of two related remedies
enumerated in Article 9. The fundamental requirement of the suggested
approach is that the creditor reduce his claim on the debt to judgment.
Such a procedure would satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process, and, of course, would vest the secured party with all the rights
of a judgment creditor. More importantly, such action would not de-
prive him of his right to repossession, which is inherent in his status as
a secured party.
By employing this procedure, the creditor would enjoy the rights of
a judgment creditor concurrently with those of a secured party. This
dynamic situation can be achieved only by successful prosecution of an
action on the debt; it is submitted, however, that such a procedure will
not involve cumbersome delay, since judgment presumably will be en-
tered by default in most instances.
It has been suggested above that this procedure is presently available
under Article 9. This conclusion presupposes that the Code has aban-
doned the doctrine of election of remedies, which at common law pre-
cluded a party from pursuing concurrently his rights as a creditor and
those as a secured party. Because the election doctrine continues to find
adherents even under the Code, it poses a serious threat to the feasibility
of the proposed procedure. Accordingly, the election of remedies prob-
lem will be the primary focus of this Comment. It will be concluded
that the doctrine has been abrogated, and that the specific suggestion
of this Comment-securing a judgment and exercising repossession rights
-is indeed viable. Before considering the election doctrine, however, it
is necessary to establish the default remedies available to a secured party
under Article 9
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A SECURED PARTY AFTER DEFAULT
Under section 9-501 (1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured
party may exercise any right and invoke any remedy accruing to him
by virtue of the Code or the security agreement.5 He is entitled under
-5.- The parties by agreement may not (with certain, exceptions) waive or vary rights
and duties set forth by the Code relating to accounting for surplus (sections 9-502(2)
and 9-504(2)), disposition of collateral (sections 9-504(3) and 9-505(1)), acceptance of
collateral as discharge of obligation (section 9-505(2)), redemption of collateral (sec-
yon 9-506), and liability of the secured party for failure to comply with Part 5 of
Article 9 (section 9-507) UNFoaM COMMURIa L CODE § 9-501(3). The parties may,
however, determine the standards by which fulfillment of their rights and duties are
to be measured so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Id.
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the Code to reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce
his security interest by any available judicial procedure. Unless the se-
curity agreement provides otherwise, a secured party also has the right
to possession of the collateral upon default.7 Possession may be gamed
through appropriate legal proceedings" or, if possible without a breach
of the peace, through self-help.9 Superimposed upon these rights is the
6. If the clan is reduced to judgment, the lien arising from any levy upon the secured
party's collateral by virtue of execution upon that judgment relates back to the date of
the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. Id. § 9-501(5). A judicial sale on
such execution is a foreclosure of the security interest by judicial procedure within the
meaning of section 9-501 (1), and the secured party may purchase the collateral at such
sale and thereafter hold it free of any other requirements of Article 9. Id. Such a sale
is public, and section 9-504(3) permits the secured party to buy at a public sale.
In the case of goods secured by documents, the secured party may proceed against
tither the documents or the goods. Id. § 9-501 (1). If the security interest extends to
both real and personal property, the secured party has the option of proceeding against
the personalty under the Code or proceeding against both in accordance with his rights
-and remedies. with respect to the real property, in which case the provisions of the
Code are not applicable. Id. § 9-501(4).
The rights, remedies, and duties of a secured party who is in possession at tme of
default or who takes possession after default also are determined by section 9-207. Id.
See also § 9-501, Comment 3. Of primary importance is the secured party's duty to use
reasonable care in custody and preservation of the collateral. Id. § 9-207(1). If the
creditor is also a seller, he may have the remedies provided in Article 2. See, e.g., UI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-113, Comment 5.If the "security interest" arises solely by virtue of Article 2 (as opposed to a security
agreement between the parties) and if the seller has possession, he is precluded from
'using the remedies of Article 9, and must invoke the seller's remedies of Article 2. Id.
9 9-113.
- 7. Id. § 9-503.
8. The possessory action will generally depend upon existing state law. In Virginia,
the action is ordinarily one of detinue. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 et seq. (Repl.
Vol. 1957), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1972); Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co, 168 Va.
72, 190 S.E. 257 (1937), In the majority of states, the action will be replevin. Three
states have augmented the UCC to remove any doubt about the judicial remedy available
by providing that "if a secured party elects to proceed by process of law, he may pro-
ceed by writ of replevin or otherwise." MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 9-503 (Repl. Vol.
1964); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1970), construed in Karp Bros. v. West Ward
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 440 Pa. 583, 271 A.2d 493 (1970); UTAH CODE AN. § 70A-9-503
(Repl. Vol. 1968).
9. UNrWoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. This section also validates provisions in the
security agreement which require the debtor, upon demand, to assemble the collateral and
make it available at a place designated by the secured party reasonably convenient to
both. Furthermore, when the secured party is entitled to possession of the collaterat
he may render equipment unusable and may dispose of it on the debtor's premises sub-
ject to the requirements of commercial reasonableness'in section 9-504(3). Id. § 9-503,
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Fuentes requirement that the debtor be afforded an opportumty to be
heard before the collateral is repossessed.' 0
Once the secured party has gained possession, however, he has the
right to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral. 1
Disposition may be by private or public proceeding, but every aspect
of the disposition must be commercially reasonable.2 In the case of a
secured indebtedness, the debtor is entitled to any surplus'3 and, unless
it is agreed otherwise, is liable for any deficiency. 14
In brief, the principal rights' 5 of the secured party on default (in a
10. See notes 2-4 supra & accompanying text.
11. UrnoM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(). The collateral may be prepared or pro-
cessed prior to disposition within the bounds of commercial reasonableness. Id.
12. Id. § 9-504(3). A secured party may buy the collateral at a public sale, but un-
less the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognazed market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations, purchase of the
collateral by the secured party at a private sale is not commercially reasonable. Id.
Commercial reasonableness has been said to embody prevailing trade practices among
reputable and responsible business and commercial enterprises engaged in the same or a
similar business. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Co., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d
347 (1966)
The collateral may be sold or otherwise disposed of as a unit or in parcels, and by
way of one or more contracts. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3).
Whether the sale is public or private, the secured party must give reasonable notice
thereof to the debtor and, in certain cases, to jumor secured parties. Id. Under the 1962
version of the Code, except with respect to consumer goods, it was necessary to notify
any person who had an existing and duly filed security interest in the collateral, as well
as any other person known by the secured party to have an interest therein. The 1972
version requires notification of persons other than the debtor only if such persons had
notified the secured party of their claims of interest before he sent notification to the
debtor or before the debtor renounced his rights under the Code. The same changes
apply under section 9-505 (2)
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-502(2), -504(2) A surplus will exist only after
application of the proceeds to reasonable expenses of disposition, the secured party's
claim, and the claims of any junior secured parties, in that order. Id. § 9-504(1).
14. Id. §§ 9-502(2), -504(2). Conversely, if the transactions underlying the security
agreement were sale of assets, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to
any surplus or liable for any deficiency only if so agreed. Id. The Washington version
of the Code precludes a deficiency in the case of a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A. 9-501(1).
15. There are of course some limitations placed upon the secured party's course of
action. For example, in a consumer transaction, if the debtor has paid 60 percent of
the cash price or loan and has not renounced his rights under the Code, a secured party
in possession after default must dispose of the collateral within 90 days. UNIFORM COM-
MERcIA. CODE § 9-505(1). Otherwise the secured party may propose to retain the col-
1axeral in satisfaction of the obligation. Id. § 9-505(2). Conversely, retention of the
collateral for an unreasonable tune may be found to indicate an intention to retain it in
satisfaction of the debt even though the secured party has manifested no such inten-
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consumer loan context) are: (1) the right to repossess and dispose of
(or retain) the collateral; (2) the right to foreclose on the collateral un-
der the security agreement; and (3) the right to reduce the claim on
the underlying debt to judgment.16
THE DocTRINE oF ELECTION OF REMEDIES
Having established the remedies available to a secured party, the cru-
cml inquiry is whether they may be pursued concurrently or succes-
sively. The Code itself seems to answer in the affirmative: The remedies
provided in section 9-501 are expressly declared to be "cumulative." 17
However, "cumulative" is not defined in the Code, and because of the
tenacity with which some courts hold to pre-Code concepts, a secured
party who brings an action on the debt and later attempts to repossess
tion. In such a case, further recovery would be barred. See, e.g., Bradford v. Lindsay
Chevrolet Co., 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 SE.2d 904 (1968), where retention of the collateral
for approximately S0 days before commencing suit on the contract and for over 16
months thereafter was found to constitute rescission and satisfaction of the contract,
barring the secured party from further recovery. Cf. Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402
S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966). These decisions do not hold that repossession of collateral
constitutes an election, barring an action on the debt. Rather, they merely stand for the
proposition that retention of collateral for an unreasonable time bars pursuit of any other
remedy.
Upon failure of the secured party to proceed in accordance with the provisions of
the Code (for example, as to good faith or commercial reasonableness), disposition may
be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions, and the secured party may
be liable to the debtor and other secured parties for loss caused by the failure to com-
ply. UNiFoRm CoMMEiicuiL CODE 5 9-07(1).
16. Additionally, the secured party has the limited right to pursue any other remedy
provided by the security agreement, and if the creditor is also a seller, he may exercise
remedies provided in Article 2. See, e.g., UNiomt CoMMERcIAL CODE S 9-113, Comment
5. Compare 4§ 2-701 and 2-706 ,with S 9-504. Furthermore, the creditor may collect the
costs and expenses of storing and processing the collateral. Id. § 9-207.
While not a remedy itself, one of the most effective methods a creditor can employ
to protect his interest m the collateral is the right to define what constitutes a default.
Default could be defined, for example, as failure of the debtor to make any required
payment, unauthorized removal of the collateral from the immediate vicinity, filing of
a bankruptcy petition, death of the debtor, legal seizure of the collateral, unauthorized
sale or transfer of the collateral, or insecurity of the secured party as to the transaction
generally. See Hogan, The Secured Party & Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47
Mie. L. Rxv. 205, 209 (1962); 6 ABA-ALI UuiroRan CoMamERcLAL CODE PRACrim Hir-
Boox/SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS at 26-27 (1966).
17. UNIORM COMMRCAL CODE § 9-501 (1). Cumulative has been defined as "increas-
ing in size or strength without corresponding loss." Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 498
P.2d 884, 886 (Wash. App. 1972), quoting from WEnsra's NEw INT'L DicnoNARY (3d
ed. 1969).
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or exercise any other remedy still must overcome the common law. doc-
trine of election of remedies. In this regard, one noted author .has stated:
It would be oversangume to hope that § 9-501 in its final version
will, despite its forthrightness, put an end to the argument. The
election of remedies doctrine is dear to the hearts of many lawyers
and procedural reforms are always bitterly resisted. We may as-
sume that the argument will continue to be made that the action
on the debt bars a later resort to the secunty'L8
The doctrine provides that if a party chooses one of two inconsistent
existing remedies, he is precluded from thereafter pursuing the other.' 9
Under pre-Code law relating to chattel mortgages and conditibnal sales,
it was frequently held that recovery of collateral by a secured creditor
was inconsistent with an action on the debt, similarly, an action on the
debt was said to bar a subsequent repossession of the goods.2" An attempt
to take possession of collateral was seen as an assertion of -ownership
rights in the secured party, while an action on the debt was viewed as
an affirmation of title to the collateral in the debtor. Once the secured
party chose either course, he was deemed to have made an election which
was final and irrevocable.2
Code section 9-202 provides that Article 9 is applicable to a secured
transaction without regard to location of title to the collateral.2 If the
18. 2 GiimoRo, SECURn'Y INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.7 at 1210 (1965).
19. See, e.g, Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1926).
20. See, e.g., Hollenberg Music Co. v. Barron, 100 Ark. 403, 140 S.W 5.82 (1911);
Boas v. Knewing, 175 Cal. 226, 165 P. 690 (1917); American Process Co. v. Florida White
Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942 (1908); Boyette v. Reliable Fin. Co., 184 So.
2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1966); Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429, 86 N.E. 775 (1909); Norman
v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 P. 78 (1916). Contra, e.g., Murray v. McDonald, 203 Iowa
418, 212 N.W 711 (1927).; Allis-ChalmersMfg. Co. v. Nem, 64 S.D. 23', 266 N.W 156
(1936); Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 190 S.E. 257 (1937). See
generally, GmrmoRE, supra note 18, 5 43.6.
It has been suggested that jurisdictions which followed the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act prior to adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code generally held that recovery of
collateral was not inconsistent with an action on the debt, while a majority of the juris-
dictions which did not enact the Uniform Conditional Sales Act held that the remedies
were inconsistent. 1959 DUKE LJ.. 640, 641-42. See generally GILMORE, supra note 18,
§ 43.6.
21. See, e.g., Filers Music House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 156 P 937 (1916). The
forfeiture aspect of common law conditional sales theory was a further "basis for the
election doctrine. See note 42 infra & accompanying text.
22. The Official Comment to section 9-101 of the Code similarly declares that 'this
article does not determine whether 'title' to collateral is in the securedparty or in the
debtor and adopts neither a 'title theory' nor a 'lien theory' of security interests."'
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purpose of Article 9 is to provide a simple and unified structure for op-
eration of secured transactions with distinctions drawn along functional
rather than formal lines,23 the succinct declaration of section 9-202, in
light of the provision of section 9-501 (1) that the secured party's rights
upon default are cumulative, would appear to render the doctrine of
election of remedies inapplicable to secured transactions under the Code.
Thus, until the debt is recovered, the secured party should be able to
bring an action for the debt and contemporaneously repossess and dis-
pose of the collateral, applying the proceeds of such disposal to the in-
debtedness.
The provision that the rights under Article 9 are "cumulative" was
not added to the Code until 1958. The 1952 version of section 9-501 (1)
merely provided that:
When a debtor is in default under the security agreement a se-
cured party may reduce his claim to judgment... If the collateral
is goods, he may in addition do one or more of the following .... :
(a) foreclose the security interest by any available judicial pro-
cedure;
(b) take possession of the collateral under Section 9-503....
In In re Adrian Research & Chermcal Co.,2  decided under the 1952
version of the Code, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
a district cour 2 5 finding that a secured party who had reduced his claim
to judgment had waived his rights to possession of the collateral 6 Pre-
Code Pennsylvania decisions had held, with respect to conditional sales
and bailment-leases, that an action on the debt was inconsistent with the
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment.
24. 269 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959).
25. 169 F Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
26. In consideration of rent arrearage due the petitioner, the debtor had executed both
a promissory note with a confession of judgment clause and an agreement creating a
security interest in the debtor's equipment. On default, petitioner obtained judgment
on the note, execution was issued, and a levy was made by the sheriff. Shortly there-
after, the debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The receiver in bankruptcy
obtained an order restraining the sheriff's sale of debtor's property on the ground that
the judgment lien was a voidable preference, having been obtained within four months
of bankruptcy. Petitioner thereupon sought to take possession of the collateral under
the security agreement.
Section 9-501(5), discussed in note 6 supra, was added to the Code shortly after the
Adrian case and would appear to resolve this particular problem. The levy of execu-
tionfollowing judgment on the debt would relate back to the date of perfection of the
security interest and the issue of voidable preference removed. Id.
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later assertion of a security interest. The district court found these de-
cisions unchanged by the 1952 version of the Code. In reversing, the
court of appeals concluded that the general purpose of the Code was to
abandon the intricacies involved in the decisions relied on by the district
court. It held that plaintiff's remedies on the debt and against the col-
lateral were consistent in kind and in purpose, each having as its objec-
tive the reduction of the debt.28 It should be emphasized that the
court relied on no specific Code provisions in reaching its decision; it
drew instead from pre-Code case law distinctions. It is apparent that the
1958 revision of section 9-501 (1) providing that the remedies are "cu-
mulative" is evidence of a determined effort by the drafters of the Code
to put to rest the intricacies of pre-Code law and that the section in its
present form coincides with the result reached by the court of appeals
in Adrian.
Several recent decisions clearly recognize that the Code was intended
to change pre-Code law regarding the doctrine of election of remedies.
A Michigan court of appeals concluded in Michigan National Bank v.
MarstonP9 that "the intent of the code was to broaden the options open
to a creditor after default rather than to limit them under the old theory
of election of remedies." So In that case the plaintiff bank held a security
interest in defendant's automobile. The defendant, prior to bankruptcy,
had placed the car in the physical control of a garageman, creating a
lien superior to plaintiff's3' and possibly in excess of the car's value. The
trustee in bankruptcy released title to the bank. After attempting un-
successfully to sell the automobile, the bank sued on the debt.
In a well-reasoned decision, the court of appeals upheld the finding
of the trial court that the bank's actions in obtaining title to the car and
in attempting to sell it were commercially reasonable under Code sec-
tion 9-504.32 It observed that the purpose of collateral is to secure the
creditor and increase his chance of recovery upon default and that the
existence of a security interest in no way affects the existence of the
27. 169 F Supp. at 359.
28. 269 F.2d at 737
29. 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970).
30. 185 N.W.2d at 51.
31. Notwithstanding section 9-501(5), a repairman's lien is superior to a prior per-
fected security interest unless that lien is statutory and the statute expressly subordi-
nates the repairman's lien to the prior perfected security interest. UNIFORM COMMM-
ctL CoDE § 9-310.
32. Since the debtor had not paid 60 percent of the loan, the provisions of section 9-




debt.'3 It was found that if the bank were required to sell the collateral,
it would first have to pay the garageman or file suit to challenge the
priority of his lien. In either case, expenses could well exceed the pro-
ceeds of such disposition, and the bank would be no closer to recovering
the debt.84
While holding that there had been no election of remedies such as to
bar the bank's action on the debt, the court noted a limitation on a se-
cured party's rights. Where disposition does not appear feasible, the
court implied that standards of commercial reasonableness require that
the collateral be returned to the debtor, still subject to the creditor's
security interest. However, in this case no evidence was found indicat-
ing a lack of commercial reasonableness or loss to the debtor caused by
the bank's failure to return title to the car.
In Peoples National Bank v. Peterson,8 5 defendants defaulted on prom-
issory notes secured in part by farm machinery and equipment. Plain-
tiff bank took possession of a substantial portion of this collateral and
simultaneously filed an action to recover upon the notes, foreclose the
security, and secure a judgment for any deficiency. Plaintiff subse-
quently mailed to defendants a notice of repossession and sale. Upon re-
ceipt of a letter from defendants' attorney noting the irregularity of sell-
Ing the collateral at the same time a foreclosure action was pending,36
plaintiff abandoned its public sale and caused a writ of attachment to be
issued. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the bank's
action on the notes, reasoning that plaintiff, in exercising its right to re-
possess the collateral peacefully and failing to sell it within a reasonable
time thereafter, had elected to retain such collateral in full satisfaction
of the indebtedness.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff was entitled con-
currently to institute an action and obtain judgment for the unpaid bal-
ance on the prormssory notes and to hold a private or public sale of prop-
33. The court noted with approval Professor Steinheimer's assertion that inasmuch
as the secured party's remedies under section 9-501 (1) are cumulative, they may be
employed without danger of election of remedies. 185 N.W.2d at 50.
34. Reasonable expenses incurred in disposing of collateral must be deducted from
the proceeds of disposition before such proceeds can be applied to the indebtedness.
UNn oR COMMERCIAL CoE S 9-504().
35. 498 P.2d 884 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
36. Although the court did not deal with this question, it would seem that there is no
"irregularity" in pursuing both foreclosure and repossession, at least up to the point at
which some definitive disposition of the property has been made or the debtor preju-
diced.
1972]
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erty in its possession, crediting the proceeds received therefrom against
defendants' indebtedness. In the event the private or public sale was
abandoned without prejudice to the debtor, or failed to dispose of all
the property described in the security agreement, the plaintiff also was
entitled to foreclose by judicial procedure upon the remaining collateral.
The court found that until the tne plaintiff abandoned the public sale,
it had acted in a commercially reasonable manner and that by with-
drawing notice of the public sale and obtaining the writ of attachment,
plaintiff was no longer proceeding under Code section 9-504(3), but was
foreclosing the security by judicial procedure as authorized by section
9-501(1).
Further support for the proposition that the intent of the Code was
to broaden a secured party's default remedies may be found in Olsen
v. Valley National Bank,3 7 upholding a bank's right to set-off a custom-
er's account without first proceeding against the collateral on a secured
indebtedness.38 That decision rejected the purported distinction between
a secured and an unsecured indebtedness, relative to the right of set-off,
holding that a bank's foresight in obtaining collateral on an indebted-
ness should not deprive it of its right of set-off. The court based its de-
cision on what it termed the "majority rule"-that a creditor may pro-
ceed with a number of remedies until the debt is satisfied-and cited Code
section 9-501 (1) for the proposition that Illinois was within the "major-
ity rule." The implicit suggestion is that the "minority rule"-that there
can be but one action for the recovery of a secured debt-could be ap-
plicable only in jurisdictions which had not adopted the Code.
ACCOMMODATING DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS TO ARTICLE 9
The combined holdings of Peterson, Olsen and Marston, coupled with
sound analysis of Code language, lends firm support to the proposition
that a secured party upon default may concurrently or successively pur-
sue a number of remedies until the debt is recovered, without danger of
"electing" a remedy 39 It follows from this general conclusion that a
secured creditor may reduce his claim on the debt to judgment, thereby
37. 91 Ill. App. 2d 365, 234 N.E.2d 547 (1968).
38. Although the right of set-off is specifically excluded as a Code remedy under
Article 9, § 9-104(i), such right may be included in the security agreement, thereby plac-
ing it within the remedial scheme encompassed by section 9-501 (1). Frank Briscoe &
Co. v. Suburban Trust Co., 100 NJ. Super. 431, 242 A.2d 54 (1968).
It is arguable that the right of set-off falls within the penumbra of the Fuentes decision.
39. Minor limitations on the secured party's rights are discussed in note 15 supra.
[Vol. 14:213
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satisfying any question of due process, and still retain his opti6n of tak-
ing pcissession and disposing of the collateral. Repossession and sale of
tiid collateral .imay be pursued in lieu of foreclosing the executioni or
ju dgment Hen or mak be. pursued concurrently with execution until all
obligations of the debtor have been satisfied.40 Professor Gilmore has
observed:
Nothing th6 secured party may do to collect his debt through
the process of the law courts will operate to destroy his security
interest -vis-a-vis the debtor or to impair its prority over third
parties.41 This seems to be an entirely sensible solution. The se-
cured party's attempt to collect his debt without immediate resort
to hs security in no sense harms or takes advantages of the debtor.
The only logical basis for the election of remedies doctrine, in this
context, was the forfeiture aspect of common law conditional sales
theory Since the Code does not allow such forfeiture, there is no
reason for stripping the secured party of his security rights because
he attempts to collect the debt first.4
40. Moreover, in those states in which attachment is a means of ensuring that the
debtor does not abscond with or secrete the property, the secured creditor may wish
to have the collateral attached. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8-519 et seq. (Repl. Vol.
1957). After attachment and levy, the debtor is subject to criminal penalties for fraudu-
lently removing or secreting the attached property with intent to defeat the levy. Id.
§§ 18.1-100, -108 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
41. Cf. § 9-501, Comment 6.
42. 2 GTLrvom, note 18 supra, § 43.7 at 1209. This proposition is not without appeal:
[T]he seller should, be permitted to pursue his in personam remedy without
waiving his in rem rights in the chattel; the seller's remedies should be made
cumulative and not m the alternative. This would be in keeping with the
seller's expectations and, it is submitted, could inprove rather than impair
the protection given the buyer. It could improve the protection given, the
buyer to allow, the security interest to -contmue beyond judgment (and until
satisfaction) because- there seems to be little doubt that it is permissible
for sellers (and it is the practice of some sellers). to obtain judgment for the
price and then proceed to levy upon and-sell the chattel sold under the con-
ditional sales contract. While this has the beneficial effect of placing the
saleunder the jurisdiction of the court, the scanty advertisement givtn ex-
ecution sales in Virginia and the failure to attract bidders usually result m
the seller being able to buy the goods at a low price and then holding the
buyer for the deficiency. It would seem that buyers with a substantial: equity
would be better protected by allowing the seller's security interest to .con-
tinue after judgment, denying the seller a right to levy on those goods but
allowing him to make sale in a manner which is more adequately - designed
to protect the buyer's equity, or, in a proper case, by allowing "hu 'to
repossess by legal process and to credit the judgment with the famrmarket
value of the goods.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Thus far this Comment has focused on the determination of whether
it is possible to repossess collateral following a judgment on the debt.
Having concluded that it is,4a and that due process guarantees are not
infringed thereby, the desirability of such a procedure remains to be
established.
ADVANTAGES OF JUDGMENT FOLLOWED BY REPOSSESSION
One advantage of seeking judgment first is the ease with which a de-
ficiency can be collected. In Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer,"
involving a combination sales-security agreement, the court character-
ized a deficiency suit as merely a simple m personam action for that part
of the sales price which remains unpaid after the seller has exhausted
his rights under Article 9 by selling the collateral.4' The court went on
to state that
[A] seller may get his "deficiency judgment" before foreclosing
his security interest or before deciding whether or not such a fore-
closure would even be necessary or desirable. By reducing his total
claim on the sales contract to judgment prior to foreclosure, a sub-
sequent deficiency action becomes unnecessary should the col-
lateral be insufficient to satisfy the buyer's debt.48
Thus, by reducing his claim to judgment, the secured party not only
satisfies due process requirements, but also establishes his right to any
deficiency. Moreover, obtaining judgment also enables the secured
party to reach assets in addition to the collateral. In the event the pro-
ceeds of a sale conducted by the secured party fail to satisfy the ob-
ligation, he still has the option of proceeding upon the judgment or ex-
Snead, Retail Installment Sales: Virginia Remedies on Default, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1, 17-18 (1959), (pre-Code law). See also Felsenfeld, Some Ruminatons About Remedies
in Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 535 (1967).
43. It should be noted, however, that those states which have enacted the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code preclude the use of the foregoing procedure. If a secured party
m a consumer credit sale repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender of goods which
were the subject of the sale or which were security for a collateral sale, and if the cash
price of such goods was $1000.00 or less, the creditor is not obligated to sell the goods,
but he may not m any case seek a deficiency UNIFORM CONSUMER Ctmrr CODE, §
5.103(1)-(3). Alternatively, where the creditor would not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment if he repossessed the collateral, his election to bring an action on the debt
constitutes a waiver of his right to repossess the collateral or to levy upon it pursuant to
any judgment he may obtain. Id. § 5.103 (6).
44. 47 N.J. 183, 219 A.2d 858 (1966).
45. 219 A.2d at 861.




ecution liens which have attached to the debtor's other property. Hav-
ing obtained judgment first, the liens will have attached earlier than those
which would have arisen from a suit following repossession and sale. This
of course will give the secured party priority over unsecured creditors
who bring a later action. Similarly, an earlier judgment may enable the
resultant lien to "ride through" a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
An additional advantage both to creditor and debtor is the likelihood
that a privately conducted, commercially reasonable sale will generate
greater proceeds than a judicial sale. While this result would obtain
regardless of whether a judgment had been rendered on the merits, it
does suggest a reason for looking to the security before seeking to col-
lect under the judgment through levy and sheriff's sale. Furthermore,
the existence of an adjudication would toll the statute of linutations to
which a deficiency suit following a non-judicial sale would otherwise
be subject.48
CONCLUSION
The apparent intent of the Uniform Commercial Code is to broaden
the options available to a creditor after default rather than to lirmt them
under the old theory of election of remedies. Inasmuch as the Code de-
clares the secured party's remedies to be cumulative, and inasmuch as dis-
tinctions regarding location of tide are eliminated, it is submitted that
a secured party may pursue all available remedies, including repossession
of collateral, concurrently or successively with an action on the debt,
until all obligations of the debtor are satisfied. The only limitations on
the creditor's action are that he must act m good faith and that the col-
lateral must be disposed of in a commercially reasonable time and man-
ner. Of course the creditor is limited to one satisfaction of the debt plus
costs.
This conclusion takes on greater significance in light of the Fuentes
decision and its extension to peaceful repossession. The due process re-
quirements of those cases can be accommodated to the secured party's
rights under Article 9 of the Code by recognizing that even after obtain-
ing personal judgment on the debt, a secured party retains his rights
against the collateral. Judgment on the debt satisfies due process, and
the creditor retains the protection and expediency of the repossession
remedy.
47. See Snead, quoted in note 42 supra.
48. See, e.g., Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 183, 219 Ald 858 (1966).
For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proceeding to judgment
in lieu of other remedies see GrgoRy, supra note 18, § 43.6 at 1201-02.
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